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Exhaustible resources and the revenues they generate present a number of broad problems for 
macroeconomic management. For example, tax revenues can be large and highly volatile, and 
the stream of revenues is finite. An increasing number of countries now view resource funds 
and/or fiscal rules for resource revenues as the answer to these challenges. In this paper, we 
explore the consequences for the UK if past revenues arising from the depletion of subsoil 
assets had been channelled into a sovereign wealth fund. We show that had a decision been 
made to establish such a fund in 1975, this could have been substantial in size by 2018 (about 
GBP 354 billion) and, moreover, would have had a number of benefits such as a reduction in 
volatility of resource revenues flowing to the Treasury. Crucially, the fund’s value would 
have substantially boosted the size of the government balance sheet, yielding corresponding 
fiscal benefits. We argue this missed opportunity is underlined further by considering the 
current debate about shale gas development in the UK. Notwithstanding considerable 
uncertainties, favourable and optimistic projections for key parameters are required for any 
shale-based fund to match what we simulate based on past experience for conventional 
subsoil assets.   
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The recent evidence that the UK may possess sizable resources of shale gas and oil has 
prompted reflection about whether the UK ‘wasted’ its North Sea petroleum resources, and 
whether some form of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) would now be a more effective way to 
use tax revenues were shale gas and oil resources to be developed. In the current UK context, 
the significance of this debate depends on the magnitude of the potential shale windfall (e.g. 
Hilaire, 2018; Andrews, 2013). But, more generally, exhaustible resources and the revenues 
they generate present two broad problems for macroeconomic management: gross production 
and tax revenues can be large and highly volatile, and the stream of revenues is finite, ending 
when the resource deposit ceases to be economic. 
 
An increasing number of countries or jurisdictions do appear to view resource funds and/or 
fiscal rules for resource revenues as an answer to such challenges (Hamilton and Ley, 2011; 
Cummine, 2016). As Ossowski et al. (2008) argue, some combination of a natural resource 
fund – of which a SWF is one variant – and fiscal rules on the use of resource revenues can 
reduce pro-cyclical tendencies and provide investments and savings to support future 
wellbeing in extractive economies (see also, for example: van der Ploeg, 2014, Hassler et al. 
2015; Clark et al. 2013 as well as Segal, 2012, and Martinez-Oviedo and Medda, 2017, for 
discussions of how to spend resource revenues).2  
 
Ossowski and Halland (2017) review the functions that SWFs can serve for the fiscal 
authorities. This includes: long-term savings and pension reserve funds – the finite stream of 
revenues from exhaustible resources can be invested in financial assets yielding benefits over 
the long term; budget stabilization – a SWF can buffer revenue volatility in addition to 
financing government priorities; foreign exchange management – many resource exporting 
countries accumulate large international reserves as a result of exporting natural resources. 
Managing these reserves to increase returns on foreign currency holdings can be another 
feature of a SWF; national development and portfolio management – some SWFs are 
permitted to invest in domestic fixed assets or financial assets on a commercial basis. This list 
 
1 Declarations of interest: none. 
2 An alternative model for a fund is an earmarked pot with which to finance projects identified ‘now’ as being 
productive investments (van der Ploeg, 2014). For example, this investment might be in domestic produced 
capital, human capital or even natural capital. 
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highlights the multiple functions that SWFs can provide as well as some potential conflicts 
between functions.3  
 
A related feature of a well-managed SWF is the expansion of the public sector balance sheet 
as resource revenues are invested in foreign financial assets. Recent work by the IMF (2018) 
focuses on the benefits that can accrue to countries with strong public sector balance sheets. 
For example, there is evidence that financial markets consider the balance sheet size as well 
as public sector debt in establishing borrowing costs (Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci 2016; Henao-
Arbelaez and Sobrinho 2017 for developing countries, and Gruber and Kamin, 2012 for 
advanced economies). Countries with stronger balance sheets may pay lower interest on their 
debt (see, IMF, 2018 Box 1.2) and may even experience shorter and shallower recessions 
compared to countries with less healthy balances. Detter and Fölster (2015) argue that better 
management of the balance sheet (both financial and fixed assets) can increase fiscal 
revenues. 
 
Given that North Sea revenues reached 9.9% of fiscal revenues and 3.7% of GDP in 1984, 
with revenues exceeding 1% of GDP from 1979 to 1987, in this paper we ask what the UK 
lost in not establishing some form of SWF in terms of the public finances and the public 
balance sheet. By examining several key aspects of the North Sea experience in the light of 
this question, the contribution of this paper is the following.  
 
First, we show how asset accounting is a critical ingredient in all of this, as it yields a 
measure of resource rents and depletion values generated by resource extraction, which may 
be subject to taxation (Hamilton, 2016, UN, 2013; Obst and Vardon, 2014) and throws light 
on the overall sustainability of the economy by enabling the calculation of depletion-adjusted 
net saving (UN, 2013; Hamilton and Hartwick, 2014). Our assessment of the effectiveness of 
resource taxation in the UK is relatively positive (in contrast to e.g. Abdo, 2010): on average 
over 65% of resource rent and 82% of resource depletion values were captured by taxes and 
royalties over 1975 to 2018. That said, our findings on the sustainability of the economy are 
less encouraging – for the same period we calculate depletion-adjusted net national saving for 
 
3 In particular, investment in domestic fixed or financial assets can undermine the integrity of the budget process 
because politicians may be inclined to choose favourites. Appreciation of the exchange rate can also occur as 
resource revenues are converted to domestic currency for investment purposes. 
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the UK, and conclude that on average this measure is less than 5% of GDP and it approaches 
0 or is negative in some years. 
 
Second, we simulate a SWF for investing these resource revenues over the period 1975 to 
2018. This is a simplified version of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund for the UK – 
a saving and pension reserve fund as described by Ossowski and Halland (2017) – where we 
assume resource revenues were invested in a global portfolio of financial assets, and that the 
fund paid out a fixed percentage of assets to the Treasury from 1975 to 2018.4 This simulated 
SWF shows that sacrifices in terms of foregone current revenues to the Treasury would have 
been large, over the years 1979 to 1987. After 1988, however, payouts from the SWF would 
have exceeded resource revenues (with minor exceptions). The volatility of payouts from the 
fund would also have been much lower than the volatility of resource revenues. 
 
Third, we show the value of the fund would have substantially boosted the size of the 
government balance sheet by 2018. While this is based on a partial analysis rather than a full 
counterfactual scenario for government finances in the presence of a SWF,5 we build on IMF 
(2018) in order to demonstrate a link between our findings and a fuller picture of national net 
worth, including the public sector. Our result here indicates the role a SWF might have had in 
strengthening the balance sheet at a critical juncture in the 2000s. The scale of this missed 
opportunity is underlined further by considering the current debate about shale gas 
development. We argue it is likely to require favourable projections for recoverable 
resources, prices and resource revenue capture for any future fund to match what we simulate 
based on past experience for North Sea petroleum resources.   
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Second 2 immediately below discusses data 
and methods. Section 3 presents an account for oil and gas assets in the UK over the period 
1975-2018 and benchmarks resource revenues against the value of resource depletion. 
 
4 Our analysis therefore builds on Hawksworth (2008) which calculates that the UK could have had a fund of 
some GBP 450 billion (an amount greater than the tax revenues collected over the period of that study). Scottish 
Government (2009) also simulate the establishment of a (hypothetical) past fund by assuming different (but 
relatively modest) percentages of tax revenues being invested as well as different rates of return. Cummine 
(2016) and Atkinson (2016) also discuss a SWF in the UK context and North Sea Oil and Gas revenues. 
5 Since there is little economic logic to simultaneously increasing debt and paying resource revenues into a 
SWF, the implication is that a counterfactual would have to include reductions in public expenditures and/or 
increases in non-petroleum revenue, especially in the early 1980s. There is an element of endogeneity at work 
here as well, since the availability of resource revenues may have led government to reduce or restrain taxation 
of the non-petroleum economy. 
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Section 4 models, and reflects on, the size of a hypothetical SWF based on historical resource 
revenues to 2018, as well as a tentative assessment of a future fund for shale gas and oil 
resources in the UK. Section 5 discusses and concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methods  
 
Our primary objective, in this paper, is to evaluate how the UK’s petroleum assets might have 
contributed to sustainability and the public finances in recent decades. In doing so, we use 
wealth accounting (and specifically, resource asset accounting) for asset values of oil and gas 
over the period 1975-2018. We also simulate a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to characterise 
how resource revenues (the fiscal revenues resource production accruing to HM Government 
over the period) might have accumulated were these explicitly invested in financial assets. 
While this fund is hypothetical, we further comment on the potential magnitude of a SWF 
were it to be started ‘now’ based on future UK conventional and unconventional petroleum 
resources. Our data and methods in this regard can summarised as follows: 
 
Resource asset account: The petroleum asset account constructed here is based on standard 
resource accounting principles as laid out in the United Nations System of Environmental and 
Economic Accounts (UN SEEA) (UN 2013). The starting point is an estimate of resource 
rents, which are measured as the difference between resource revenues and the economic cost 
of extraction, which includes current extraction costs, depreciation and the opportunity cost 
of fixed capital as well as (current) decommissioning costs. We use data in OGA (2019a) as 
well as ONS (various) to estimate our resource asset account. A complication of these UK 
data is that there are no separate extraction cost estimates available for natural gas. We 
therefore use the oil extraction costs in estimating resource rents, and treat gas as a co-
product of oil extraction. Resource revenues in the rent calculation are therefore the sum of 
revenues from oil and gas extraction.  
 
Resource asset values are calculated as the present value of resource rents up to the point of 
exhaustion. Physical reserves are measured as the sum of proven and probable resources. For 
purposes of the present value calculation, resource rents are fixed at the current year and held 
constant up to the point of exhaustion. This is how resource asset values are typically 
estimated, although in some instances governments use specific forecasts of prices, costs and 
quantities extracted (see, for example, Kahn et al. 2013). The key assumptions and 
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parameters used in estimating petroleum asset values are shown in Table A1.1 in Annex 1 to 
this paper. The rate of return used to establish the opportunity cost of fixed capital is equal to 
the 10 year moving average of interest rates on government bonds as measured in 2013, while 
the discount rate is the recommended rate from the UK Green Book for cost-benefit analyses 
covering periods of 30 years or less (HM Treasury, 2018). For simplicity we assume these 
rates to be fixed from 1975 to 2018,6 which may lead to minor differences between our asset 
estimates and any values published by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
 
As stipulated in the SEEA, the value of depletion of petroleum is measured as the unit value 
of depletion times the quantity extracted (where, again, gas is measured in tonnes of oil 
equivalent). The unit value of depletion is equal to the current resource asset value divided by 
the current physical stock.7 The resulting resource asset account estimates can be found in 
Annex 1 (Table A1.2).  
 
Where these resource asset account data are examined in the context of the broader UK 
economy – notably when we estimate depletion-adjusted net saving – we additionally draw 
on data published in ONS (various).  
 
Simulated SWF – 1975 to 2018: Data on resource revenues from 1975 to 2018 are taken from 
the database in OBR (various) and used to simulate a fund on the basis of three principles: (a) 
all petroleum revenues are paid into the fund; (b) revenues are invested in foreign financial 
assets; and, (c) payouts from the fund to the Treasury are at a fixed percentage rate each year. 
The fixed payout rate we use is based upon aggregate long-run real rates of returns on assets 
in major economies from 1900 to 2018 (Credit Suisse, 2019). We assume that the fund is 
fully invested in a ‘moderate growth’ global portfolio of 60% equities and 40% bonds, which 
yields a mean real rate of return of 3.76%. This is an application of the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund approach to saving petroleum revenues to UK data. As the largest 
and one of the most enduring SWFs in the world, this provides a useful model.8 
 
6 These are respectively 4.3% and 3.5%. 
7 Note that this methodology implicitly accounts for resource discoveries. As shown in Hamilton and Atkinson 
(2013), as long as resource rents are assumed to be constant over the resource lifetime, the unit value of 
depletion declines when there is an increase in the physical stock owing to discoveries. Other things being equal 
therefore, a depletion-adjusted measure of Net National Income rises when new resources are discovered. 
8 Note that in Norway’s case, petroleum resource revenues were large relative to central government 
expenditure from the outset. The policy rule in Norway is to invest petroleum revenues in excess of the non-oil 
budget deficit in the petroleum fund. Over time the petroleum fund grew to the point where fiscal policy now 




The simulation of the fund is straightforward. The net value of the fund at the end of the 
preceding period is equal to the gross value minus the payout on the gross value. The gross 
value of the fund at the end of the current period is therefore equal to current resource 
revenues, plus the net value of the fund at the end of the preceding period times 1 plus the 
nominal rate of return on assets in the current period. A complication in the simulation is that 
only long run averages are reported in Credit Suisse (2019), while the underlying (Dimson-
Marsh-Staunton) data on real returns by country by year are proprietary. We are therefore 
forced to construct a synthetic annual nominal rate of return for the UK SWF as the sum of 
the long-run aggregate real return on assets plus the rate of inflation in the UK economy as 
measured by the GDP deflator. The synthetic nominal returns can differ considerably from 
actual returns in any given year because the assumed constant real rate of return on assets 
introduces a strong element of smoothing in the calculation. As Credit Suisse (2011) shows, 
the long run volatility of global financial assets is considerable, with a standard deviation of 
17.7% for returns on equities and 10.4% for bonds. Over the long run, however, the value of 
the smoothed fund should be close to that of a fund based on nominal returns. We explore the 
implications of volatility in actual returns in subsequent discussion based on US data (Section 
4 and Annex 2). We also examine an alternative procedure for simulating our SWF based on 
a permanent income approach (Section 4 and Annex 3). 
 
SWF for (future) shale gas and oil: To frame further our findings on the missed opportunity 
of a past SWF, we speculate on the magnitude of a fund based on potential (albeit, uncertain) 
development of unconventional resources in the UK in the future: e.g. on-shore shale gas and 
oil resources. The basis of this is recent studies undertaken by the British Geological Survey 
(BGS) which provide a geological assessment of those areas identified as having considerable 
potential prospectivity within: (a) the North UK Carboniferous Shale Region: geological 
basins and troughs across northern England and southern Scotland (Andrews, 2013; 
Monaghan, 2014); and, (b) the South UK Jurassic Shale Region: basins in Southern England 
and offshore into the English Channel (Andrews, 2014; Greenhalgh, 2016). Table A1.3 in 
Annex 1 to this paper summarise these data.  
 
the fund assumed by the Norwegian government. This is effectively a ‘bird-in-hand’ rule. The Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund initially invested in low-risk fixed income, but currently invests in a portfolio 
consisting of 60% equities and 40% fixed income, which is the portfolio composition that we assume in our 





While these data provide a relatively granular geological assessment, these refer to a metric 
of resource extent which is extremely broad: resources-in-place or the total quantities 
reckoned to be physically contained in source rock (US EIA, 2013). As such, it encompasses 
resources which may not ultimately be recoverable (either technically or economically) and 
so is best interpreted as circumscribing upper bounds given existing geological knowledge. 
To calculate a speculative SWF based on these undeveloped shale gas and oil resources, we 
rely on a range of assumptions about ultimate recoverability in combination with assumed 
values for resource prices (in GBP 2015) from both our historical series (1975-2018) and the 
trajectory of prices used in forecasts by BEIS (2017).9 Two final parameters in this 
calculation are the share of total rent in the production value of unconventional resources. 
Our assumed range for proportion of total rents captured in the form of resource revenues is 
also drawn from our historical series. These data and assumptions are summarised in Table 
A1.4 in Annex 1. 
 
3. Accounting for UK Oil and Gas 
 
3.1 UK Petroleum Assets and Sustainability 
 
Measuring the value of resource depletion is an essential input into policies for sustainable 
development in extractive economies. The Hartwick Rule (Hartwick 1977) shows that future 
consumption can be sustained when exhaustible resources are extracted if other investments 
offset the value of resource depletion. Hamilton and Clemens (1999) show that wellbeing 
cannot be sustained if ‘genuine’ saving, including the value of resource depletion, is negative. 
This forward-looking strategy for saving has parallels too with the permanent income 
hypothesis (see, for example, van der Ploeg, 2014). 
 
The practical link between changes in total wealth and sustainability was first explored by 
Pearce and Atkinson (1993). Subsequent growth theoretic literature, including Hamilton and 
Clemens (1999), Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) and Asheim and Weitzman (2001), has 
 
9 In effect, we assume that oil and gas prices are positively coupled. Erdös (2012), for example, examines the 
(de)coupling of oil and gas prices in the US, Europe and UK. In the case of the latter at least, the author finds 




elaborated the theoretical foundations for this approach to measuring sustainability. The 
World Bank publishes figures on Adjusted Net Saving (ANS) going back to 1970 for over 
150 countries in the World Development Indicators. This extended measure of the change in 
real wealth includes not only resource depletion but also investments in human capital (via 
education expenditures) and damages from pollution exposure (see, also Hamilton and 
Atkinson, 1996 for early estimates for the UK on these lines). While excluding education 
expenditures and pollution damages, the SEEA recommends two extended national 
accounting aggregates – depletion-adjusted net saving and net income. 
 
Figure 1: Depletion-adjusted Net Saving in the UK (% of GDP) 
 
Source: authors estimates from ONS (various) 
 
 
In Figure 1, we comment on asset accumulation and wealth more generally for the UK. A key 
measure here is depletion-adjusted saving which is low but positive (under 5% of GDP, with 
a declining trend) for much of the period.10 However, depletion-adjusted net saving briefly 
dips when the value of resource depletion was at its highest in the 1980s and again for a more 
 
10 This is likely to overstate genuine saving which as previously mentioned includes a range of pollution 
damages such as the social cost of carbon. Put another way, UK sustainability is likely to be overstated here. 
However, we use the UN SEEA standard of depletion-adjusted net saving in order to focus upon saving net of 
oil and gas depletion.  
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prolonged period from 2000 onwards.11 Indeed, in two of the latter years, depletion-adjusted 
saving is negative. 
 
Of course, some portion of what officially comprises government consumption may also have 
constituted investment in intangible wealth, particularly expenditure on education (see, for 
example, Cummine, 2016). Figure 1 plots government spending on education over the period. 
On average, these expenditures were about 3.5% of GDP from 1975-2018 with slightly 
higher percentages at the beginning of this period. Education expenditures (relative to GDP) 
do not seem to be higher in the wake of higher resource depletion values. In fact, from 1979 
to 1985 education expenditures decreased by -0.23%, in real terms, on average per annum 
(ONS, various). This is considerably lower than the average annual increase (1.2%) for 1975-
2018. By contrast, non-education government consumption expenditure (not shown here) 
increased by about 3.4% per annum over 1979-1985. 
 
3.2 Accounting for Government Resource Revenues 
 
Highly aggregated insights about the sustainability of the economy take us only so far. 
Relating this asset accounting to the public finances is also important given that a critical 
pathway for boosting savings from resource depletion arises from appropriating these 
benefits through the tax regime.  
 
This tax regime, established in the Oil Taxation Act of 1975, has evolved substantially over 
subsequent years (HMRC, 2008; Kemp, 2011a,b) and now consists of two (field-based) 
charges applied to the net profits12 of producers: Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) and 
Corporation Tax (CT). These charges themselves have undergone a number of revisions over 
the years, and PRT does not apply to fields developed after March 1993.13 A number of other 
taxes have applied at earlier stages of the period we examine (Abdo, 2010; Nakhle, 2008). A 
 
11 Recent updates in ONS (various) have changed procedures of accounting for depreciation of produced capital 
(as well as stocks). This has had the effect of boosting these estimates, compared to the previous procedure. 
However, data using this new method are available from 1987 only. Figure 1 utilises data on produced capital 
depreciation from 1975 to 1986 which use the old procedure and, in effect, our savings estimate is understated 
until 1987 because of this discrepancy. 
12 Defined as the value of production net of allowable capital and operating expenditures. 
13 The tax rates for both PRT and CT have also undergone a number of revisions. PRT rates have been 45% 
(until 1978), 60% in 1978, 70% from 1979 before reaching a peak of 75% level in 1983. From 1993, this was 
reduced to 50% although in 2016 the rate – from that point on – was reduced to zero (although PRT still exists 
as producers can claim relief on past payments given decommissioning costs). CT for resource producers has 
tracked the standard corporation tax, from 2002. But this was complemented by a further supplementary charge 
introduced at 10% but increased from the beginning of 2006 to 20% and to 32% in 2011.  
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‘Royalty’ amounting to a charge on the gross value of oil and gas (less allowable deductions) 
produced applied to fields licenced before 1982 only and was discontinued altogether by 
2002. In addition, two ad hoc charges (established in 1981) were Supplementary Petroleum 
Duty (SPD) and a Gas Levy (on otherwise tax exempt gas). The former was short-lived and 
abolished after two calendar years while the latter was phased out after the late 1990s. 
 
On average, these resource revenues contributed 2.2% of total government revenues over the 
period 1975 to 2018. This average is skewed by the tax proceeds accruing in the 1980s where 
this amounted to 5.6% of total revenues on average (and 8.2% on average from 1981 to 
1985). The relative importance of the different tax instruments discussed previously has 
changed over the years. Most notable was the relative importance of PRT in the late 1970s 
and much of the 1980s and the role of the CT as the principal instrument used to collect 
resource revenues in the oil and gas sector in the later years of our study period.  
 
Figure 2: Resource Revenues in Comparison to Depletion Values (GBP million, 2018) 
Source: OBR (various) and authors estimates from ONS (various) 
 
Figure 2 compares revenues with depletion values since, according to the theory outlined 
above, this is the portion of total resource rents which must be invested in other assets if 
sustainability is to be achieved. What is striking is that the two series track one another 
reasonably closely indicating the extent to which these resource revenues have succeeded in 
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capturing depletion values. On average, this amount captured through taxation corresponds to 
about 82.3% of depletion values from 1975-2018 (which, in turn, corresponds to 65.6% of 
resource rents over the same period). While this tax regime has been critiqued on the grounds 
of being dominated by short-term macroeconomic policy and creating uncertainty for 
resource exploration and development (Kemp, 2011a; Nakhle, 2008), it appears to have been 
effective in capturing depletion values.  
 
What this asset accounting misses is whether these depletion values were optimal (which 
would require that marginal resource rents rise at the rate of interest – the Hotelling Rule). 
Moreover, while the average performance of the tax regime is important, so is its variability. 
Abdo (2014) situates this in a governance context by distinguishing between ‘proprietorial’ 
and ‘non-proprietorial’ (fiscal) regimes over this period in the UK. In the former a primary 
objective for government is capturing for the public benefit the proceeds of resource 
depletion. In the latter, government adopts a lighter fiscal regime in order to enhance 
incentives to deplete known reserves as well as invest in exploration activities. 
 
Both objectives are articulated in HMRC (2008). The central argument in Abdo (2014) is that 
different weight has been placed on each by UK Government over the years: that is, up to 
1983, this fiscal regime is characterised as proprietorial, and thereafter was non-proprietorial 
with a movement back to a proprietary stance after 2002. To what extent can the trends in 
Figure 2 be understood in this light of this? In the 1980s it seems that resource revenues 
tracked closely depletion values and indeed the tax regime over-performed in respect of a 
criterion to at least capture this value, albeit in the context of declining depletion value. By 
contrast, from 2000 onwards (and to some extent starting the mid-1990s) there was 
substantial divergence, with tax revenues falling short of depletion values at least until 
towards the end of study period.  
 
Figure 2 plots revenue data from all production fields (which differ by development date and 
thus fiscal regime). Moreover, there is likely to be a lag between fiscal policy change and 
ensuing revenues. Abdo (2010), for example, concludes that the UK tax regime allowed 
companies in the UK continental shelf to accumulate, and retain, substantial profits in the 
period 2002 to 2007 but that, importantly, this can traced back to a series of measures 
beginning in the early 1980s, mostly introduced with a view to creating greater incentives for 
private investment activities. A clear implication of Abdo (2010, 2014) – echoing an earlier 
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contribution on these lines by Rutledge and Wright (1998) – is that the UK government may 
have sacrificed potential resource revenues. 
 
4. Simulating a Sovereign Wealth Fund for the UK 
 
The technique we use to simulate a UK SWF is based on the ‘bird-in-hand’ approach 
employed by the Norwegian Government Pension Fund. This directs all petroleum tax 
revenues to a fund invested in foreign financial assets; the fund then pays out investment 
returns to government general revenues. The key alternative to the bird-in-hand model is the 
‘permanent income approach’, whereby the finite stream of resource revenues is converted to 
a constant stream of payments to the fiscus over the indefinite future. This is achieved by 
investing an increasing share of resource revenues in a SWF, so that the resulting constant 
income is a mixture of tax revenues and returns on the SWF. We apply this model to the UK 
data in Annex 3. As seen in this Annex, the two approaches yield divergent outcomes. The 
permanent income approach, as expected, yields revenues which can be transferred to general 
government receipts especially in initial periods. The bird-in-hand approach initially has a 
greater opportunity cost (in terms of foregone revenues) but yields a larger fund, and so 
provides larger returns later on and into the indefinite future. 
 
The permanent income model is typically recommended for developing countries because the 
welfare costs of delaying benefits from the resource windfall are high in the poorest 
countries. These countries can also suffer from institutional weakness, leading van der Ploeg 
(2017) to lay out a series of guidelines – or government commitments – that developing 
country governments should make to ensure long term sustainable benefits to the country 
from petroleum discoveries. These commitments include an intergenerational fund invested 
in foreign financial assets, a liquidity fund to deal with resource price volatility, and an 
investment fund aimed at domestic public investments, taking account of country absorptive 
capacity. The bird-in-hand model is better suited to higher income countries who can afford 
to delay the benefits from a resource discovery. 
 
One of the potential benefits of establishing a SWF in countries with a resource windfall is an 
increase in the sustainability of development (defined as a development path where national 
wellbeing is non-decreasing). The canonical model for achieving this outcome is the 
Hartwick Rule (Hartwick 1977) with its famous dictum: invest resource rents. As generalized 
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in Hamilton and Withagen (2007) and Hamilton (2016), if policy ensures that ‘adjusted’ net 
saving is non-negative and growing at a rate less than the interest rate along the development 
path, then welfare will be non-decreasing along the path. Savings can be invested in a wide 
range of assets including produced capital, human capital and intellectual capital. Our 
analysis of the UK petroleum resource asset account in Section 3 is closely linked to the 
question of sustainability, since we show that depletion-adjusted net saving dropped sharply 
in the early 2000’s, actually turning negative, before recovering in 2011. 
 
Simulating a bird-in-hand SWF for UK petroleum exploitation starting in 1975 offers some 
useful insights. First, investment of resource revenues in a SWF is by its nature a step toward 
sustainability because it increases saving. But extracting a quantity of petroleum is equally, 
by its nature, a step away from sustainability because extraction represents dissaving. The net 
effect of establishing a SWF on sustainability therefore depends on the relative size of these 
two effects. We would expect resource taxation to be less than the resource rent – otherwise 
the private sector has no interest in investing – while Hamilton (2016) shows that the value of 
resource depletion will be less than total resource rent under SEEA accounting standards. 
Policies to increase sustainability in the context of a SWF must therefore aim for resource 
taxation that falls between the value of resource depletion and total resource rents on 
extraction. However, any analysis of sustainability with a SWF must assume ‘other things 
being equal’. In practice, policies leading to dissaving in the private and public sectors could 
conceivably offset any net saving associated with the operation of the SWF. 
 
4.1 Looking Back on 1975 to 2018 
 
To understand the potential benefits of a SWF for the UK, we simulate a fund established in 
1975 and track its size and returns paid out to the Treasury up to 2018. This provides 
estimates of the sacrifices entailed by the fund (years when resource revenues exceeded fund 
payouts), the long-run potential payout from 2018 onwards, and the reduction in volatility of 
revenues into the Treasury when fund payouts are compared to current resource revenues. 
Based on the smoothed accounting assumed in our approach, the simulated value of the fund 
totals around GBP 354 billion in 2018 (nominal). Using produced capital assets as a 
comparator, the hypothetical fund value amounts to 7.8% of total produced assets in the UK 
in that year, but would exceed the value of produced assets in the central government balance 
sheet (e.g. ONS, 2019). 
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Figure 3: Resource Revenues and Returns from a (Simulated) SWF (GBP million, 2018) 
 
Source: OBR (various) and authors estimates  
 
Figure 3 plots the evolution of resource revenues and the value of the payout from the 
simulated fund from 1975 to 2018. Two key conclusions follow:  
 
First, the payouts from the SWF are less volatile than annual resource revenues, and payouts 
exceed resource revenues from 1988 onward (with two minor exceptions). This is to some 
extent an artefact of the smoothing introduced by our synthetic calculation of nominal 
returns. In Annex 2 we simulate a UK SWF that invests all of its revenues in US stocks and 
bonds, building upon historical data on nominal returns on US financial assets (Damodaran, 
2014). This fund is compared with a SWF that also invests in US financial assets but uses a 
synthetic nominal return as constructed for the SWF underlying Figure 3.  The simulation in 
Annex 2 shows that the resource fund buffers revenues and thereby reduces the volatility of 
flows to the Treasury. Yet there is a partially offsetting source of volatility in the form of year 
to year variation in the nominal returns on investment in the portfolio of the SWF, which 
would affect the total value of the fund at any given time. Specifically, the standard deviation 
of year to year changes in flows is, indeed, considerably higher for resource revenues. It is 
nearly 3 times more volatile than for the fund simulated using nominal rates of return, and 




Second, resource revenues were much larger than the payout from the fund from 1979 to 
1986, the period following the second oil crisis. While a slow buildup of payouts is a natural 
property of a ‘bird-in-hand’ fund, reflecting the time needed to accumulate significant 
financial assets, this result indicates the considerable short-run sacrifices that government 
would have had to make in implementing the fund. The compensation for this sacrifice would 
be a fund that continues to make annual payouts of tens of billions of pounds to the Treasury 
long after the North Sea petroleum deposits have ceased to be in production.14  
 
Given the current prevalence of SWFs in a growing number of resource-abundant countries, 
it is worth asking why the UK chose not to establish a fund. Kemp (2011a,b) provides a 
thorough review of the relevant official historical documents (including British Cabinet 
minutes and papers) providing formal records of this decision, in the late 1970s. His account 
indicates a wide-ranging debate in Government,15 but perhaps most notably at no time did it 
consider intergenerational equity, as a guiding principle for managing the resource windfall. 
This focus came more to the fore, it appears, in the early- to mid-1980s in a series of 
contributions by the Bank of England (BoE 1980, 1982 and, later, 1986), which explicitly 
recognised that large resource revenues were generated by a ‘wasting asset’ and as such: “… 
would require investment of sufficient of the revenues to maintain the real value of the 
capital.” (BoE, 1982, p56).16  
 
Of course, these discussions took place in a difficult economic context, particularly in the 
early 1980s (see, for example, Bean, 1987). Kemp (2011a) notes a significant element of the 
economic strategy of the in-coming Conservative administration in 1979 was to use resource 
revenues to support its macroeconomic policy and reduce public borrowing. HM Government 
Budgets from 1979 reduced both basic and higher rates of income tax, while the tax rate on 
 
14 In principle, a fund and its flow of returns could be utilised broadly and on the basis of some decision rule 
governing public spending. In practice, some portion of returns might be earmarked. For example, Abdo et al. 
(2018) discuss liabilities arising from decommissioning costs of oil and gas related infrastructure in the North 
Sea. For example, a report by OGA (2019b) estimates these costs to be around £49 billion. Such sums are 
clearly substantial, but are the responsibility of private sector oil and gas operators. Nonetheless, NAO (2019) 
note that HM Government (and so taxpayers) are ultimately responsible for these liabilities if private operators, 
for some legal reason, cannot meet their obligations (such as through insolvency). 
15 This included debate about the appropriate scale of a fund (e.g. would it be a repository for all resource 
revenues or just some smaller proportion); the expenditure it could facilitate (i.e. discrete investment projects or 
reducing external debt burdens) and whether this hypothecation of tax revenues would misallocate resources by 
possibly divorcing these spending decisions from normal fiscal processes.  
16 Odling-Smee and Riley (1985) examines this same issue from the perspective of the UK Treasury and the role 
of resource revenues in improving public finances. 
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corporations was considerably reduced from 1984. Resource tax rates meanwhile rose, with 
the PRT rate levied on oil and gas was increasing in 1979, 1980 and 1982. As a result, 
resource revenues increased from 3.5% of central government tax receipts in 1979 to peak at 
almost 10% in 1984.  
 





Source: OBR (various) and ONS (various) 
 
The fiscal consequences of investing all resource revenues in a SWF in the early 1980s would 
have been correspondingly large. To illustrate this, Figure 4 focuses on the first decade of oil 
production. Both government consumption and total expenditure grew strongly (in real terms) 
from 1975 to 1985. There was a flattening of non-resource revenue from 1975 to 1979, and it 
grew more slowly than total and consumption expenditure afterwards. Because money is 
fungible there is no unambiguous way to determine how resource revenues affected the main 
fiscal aggregates historically. The figure makes clear, however, that resource revenues were a 
significant contributor to total government revenue from 1981 to 1985. 
Considering the counterfactual for public finances over 1975-1985, if government were to 
invest all resource revenues in a SWF while avoiding additional borrowing, it would have 
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had to decrease expenditure or increase non-oil revenue (or some combination of the two) by 
a considerable amount compared with the historical experience, peaking (as noted) at nearly 
10% of total fiscal revenues, or 3.7% of GDP, in 1984. This would have led to negative 
consequences for GDP growth, although this would have been mitigated to some extent 
owing to the reduced volatility of government tax revenues. As Figure 3 shows, however, 
from 1988 onward the returns from the fund would have exceeded resource revenues in most 
years. The counterfactual over this period would have been government enjoying higher and 
less volatile total revenues than it enjoyed historically, with positive consequences for GDP 
growth. These effects of a SWF on government revenues would therefore be countervailing 
over the years prior to and following 1988.The choice to invest in a fund would have 
continuously strengthened the public sector balance sheet relative to the historical experience, 
while at the same time buffering the public finances from the effects of resource price 
volatility. It is worth recalling the arguments in IMF (2018), whereby a stronger public sector 
balance sheet has positive impacts on the cost of debt and may lead to quicker recoveries 
from recessions.  
 
Focusing on the public sector balance sheet, Figure 5 plots the net worth of general 
government from 1995 to 2018. The starting point for this is ONS (various) which now 
publishes the general government balance sheet annually, with the series beginning in 1995.17 
The accounts do not include the value of natural resources other than land. Figure 5 measures 
public sector net worth including North Sea oil and gas, building on the resource accounts 
presented in Section 2. The value of the simulated SWF is also included in Figure 5, 
providing a measure of the potential public sector net worth if government had decided to 
implement such a fund. Note, however, that in a counterfactual world where the UK did 
implement a SWF, the estimates of general government net worth could differ from what is 
shown in Figure 5 because, as discussed above, total general government tax revenues would 
differ from the historical figures over the life of the SWF (see Figure 3), with the result that 
public sector investments in land and produced assets would also be expected to differ from 





17 These ONS data differ from the data in IMF (2018) as the latter includes the assets and liabilities of those 
financial corporations which remain publicly owned (in the wake of the financial crisis post-2008) and provides 
a fuller assessment of the pension liabilities for public employees. 
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Source: ONS (various), OBR (various) and authors’ calculations.  
Note: ‘fund’ refers to our simulated (bird-in-hand) SWF 
 
Figure 5 shows that in 2006, just before the financial crisis, including petroleum assets as 
well as the simulated SWF boosts general government net worth from 6% of GDP (the 
published figure) to 32% of GDP. All three measures of net worth plunge in tandem starting 
in 2007. But by 2018 the broadest measure of public sector net worth reached -25% of GDP, 
versus the historical figure of -44% of GDP as published by ONS. The value of the simulated 
SWF averages close to 17% of GDP over the whole period 1995-2018. As a result, this 
broadest measure of public sector is positive, on average, over the period (9% of GDP), 
whereas it is negative on average for the other two net worth metrics in the figure.  
 
As seen in Figure 5, government borrowing jumped sharply in response to the financial crisis. 
If a SWF were operational at this point, the clear priority for government would be fiscal and 
monetary stimulus, rather than continued payments into the fund. Indeed, data for Norway 
show that payments into the Government Pension Fund declined by 60% over 2008-2010, 
followed by minor capital withdrawals in 2016-2017 and renewed payments into the fund in 
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2018.18 Beyond the immediate crisis, the policy challenge for any government would be 
determining when to return to regular payments into the SWF. 
 
More generally, our analysis of a simulated SWF for the UK has noted the many uncertainties 
in the estimated value of the fund and its financial returns, including the lack of a 
counterfactual effect on the public finances that would entail if all resource revenues had 
been invested in the fund starting in 1975. The lack of annual data on returns to global 
financial assets is also an important limitation. But the simulation suggests that the UK 
government could be on significantly stronger grounds, as measured by the public sector 
balance sheet, in 2018 compared with the historical experience. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that choosing to establish a SWF in 1975 would have had 
general equilibrium effects on the economy, given the size of the petroleum revenues that 
would have been invested in the fund rather than paid into the fiscus (3.7% of GDP in 1984). 
GDP would not only have been lower prior to 1988 and higher thereafter, but its composition 
would have changed as prices and quantities adjusted across multiple markets. An 
overarching effect of implementing the SWF would have been reductions in Dutch Disease as 
a result of investing the revenues in foreign financial assets, with consequent general 
equilibrium effects on the trade balance. 
 
4.2 Looking Forward – Conventional and Unconventional Gas and Oil Resources 
 
While the preceding historical simulation of a SWF has intrinsic interest, our framework has 
implications for the future as well. That is, if the UK were to start a fund ‘now’ in order 
channel revenues from remaining petroleum reserves, how might this compare with the 
missed opportunity of the SWF that we have simulated? Developing an illustrative model of a 
future SWF for petroleum resources is therefore another of our key objectives in this paper. 
 
In this respect, UK petroleum reserves remain substantial. OGA (2019c) indicate that closing 
stocks of proven and probable reserves of UK oil and gas in 2018 while sizable correspond 
(in tonnes of oil equivalent) to under 13% of cumulative production over the period 1975-
 
18 Statistics Norway (2019)  
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2018. Broader definitions of reserves change this picture considerably, of course.19 But a 
reasonable presumption might be that a SWF for North Sea petroleum resources started 
‘now’ would be small compared to the missed opportunity of a past fund, in the absence of 
relatively optimistic forecasts about resource prices and the extent of reserves. 
 
The foregoing refers to conventional resources. A potential SWF has been discussed 
relatively recently within UK policy processes for unconventional resources (see, for 
example, HM Treasury, 2013, 2017): most notably to natural gas or oil resources trapped in 
shale beds – formed of sedimentary rocks. These can be freed by hydraulic fracturing (or 
‘fracking‘) entailing injection of fluids, including water, at high pressure into these rocks 
(Royal Society/ Royal Academy of Engineers, 2012). Significant attention has centred on 
shale gas production in the US using this technology, its transformative effect on the gas 
market, as well as the institutional reasons for this boom (see, for example: Rogers, 2011; 
Wang and Krupnick, 2013). Debate has also focused on the range of negative externalities 
such as damage from water pollution and seismicity (see, for example, Krupnick et al. 2013; 
Royal Society/ Royal Academy of Engineers, 2012; Mason et al. 2015).20 Indeed, such 
considerations have framed a lot of the surrounding political debate and as recently as 
November 2019, the UK Government announced a new moratorium on fracking.21  
 
In what follows, however, we ask an ‘in principle’ question about the potential magnitude of 
a UK fund based on unconventional resource revenues. This is not straightforward. Notably, 
as indicated in Table A1.3 in Annex 1, available data for these physical resources are broad 
definitions of resource extent and do not indicate resources which might ultimately be 
economically recoverable (given prices, costs and so on). Hilaire et al. (2015) and Saussay 
(2018) respectively estimate this across continental Europe and globally by combining 
detailed US data in conjunction with less fine-grained geological data that exist outside of the 
US where resource production is limited or has not yet begun. However, these extrapolations 
are not applicable to the UK specifically. Sandrea and Sandrea (2014) and Sandrea and Peels 
 
19 This would include contingent resources (defined as known resources which are potentially recoverable in a 
technical sense) and prospective (i.e. undiscovered) resources, whether mapped or as yet unmapped (OGA, 
2019a).  
20 Cotton et al. (2014) discuss one further but related obstacle which is the way in which perceptions of local 
costs versus wider benefits frames how those living in the vicinity of possibly rich deposits perceive the fairness 
of proposals to drill exploratory wells. 
21 This, on of the face of it, was based largely on concerns about seismicity (see, for example, Financial Times, 
2nd November, https://www.ft.com/content/35591716-fcc5-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6 [Accessed 15/11/19]  
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(2014) estimate actual recovery factors – in effect, economically recoverable resources – as a 
proportion of gas-in-place across a wide range of deposits in the US. These range from 1.7% 
to 11.2% with Sandrea and Peels (2014) estimating an average recovery factor of 5.4%. US 
EIA (2013) stresses the geological complexity of extracting UK shale resources compared to 
the US experience. Indeed, the relationship between technical recoverability and gas-in-place 
in Table A1.3 (from US EIA, 2015) is around 4%. Speculating on the size of a potential UK 
fund based on unconventional resources obviously then requires caution. We do so here, 
however, to gain some sense of the circumstances in which this fund might approach in 
magnitude the apparent missed opportunity of the past, as suggested by our simulated fund 
for conventional resources from 1975-2018.  
 
Table 1: Hypothetical values of a SWF for UK Shale Resources (2018, GBP millions) 
 
   Resource extent 











 Median       20,691       33,829       58,408  
Min.        5,542          9,061        15,645  
Max.      62,072       101,487      175,224  
M
ed
. Median       51,726       84,572      146,020  
Min.       13,855       22,653         39,113  
Max.      155,179      253,717      438,061  
H
ig
h Median      82,762       135,316     233,633  Min.       22,168       36,245       62,580  
Max.    248,286     405,947     700,898  
Source: authors’ calculations based on data and assumptions in Table A1.4 in Annex 1. 
 
 
Table 1 illustrates some findings from simulations based on all combinations of our 
assumptions (Table A1.4 in Annex 1). As the key parameters are resource extent and 
recoverability, the table organises these summary findings according to ‘low’, ‘medium’ and 
‘high’ for each of these parameters. The specific values in the Table describe the median fund 
size and the minimum/ maximum fund size (e.g. given assumed resource extent/ 
recoverability as well as other assumptions about price, rents and revenue capture). Again it 
is important to acknowledge the tentative character of these estimates. Moreover, we do not 
consider the environmental and regulatory hurdles (KPMG, 2011) that will determine the 
value of these resources as economic assets. Nor do these estimates speak to the timing of a 
fund accruing, as we have not assumed a further (arbitrary) depletion path. 
 
Nevertheless, what seems reasonably clear is that this (hypothetical) simulated future fund is 
comparable in size to our simulated fund for conventional resources only if relatively high 
levels of resource extent apply. Of course, the probability assessments in Andrews (2014, 
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2013), Monaghan (2014) and Greenhalgh (2016), and summarised in Table 1, imply that 
these magnitudes are far less likely to be exceeded. A more conservative approach might 
therefore focus mostly on lower estimates of resources extent. For median magnitudes of 
resource extent – i.e. those which have a 50% probability of being exceeded – an implied 
(future) fund starts to approach our £354 billion threshold value only if recoverability along 
with values for other parameters are relatively high. Not surprisingly, for low values of 
resource extent the reckoned future fund is correspondingly smaller even when combined 
with relatively optimistic values for other parameters. While these magnitudes cannot be said 
to be trivial, arguably these do underline the missed opportunity of the fund based on 
conventional resources from 1975-2018. 
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Our simulated sovereign wealth fund (SWF) suggests that, had the UK established such a 
fund along the lines of the Norwegian example starting in 1975, its value would amount to 
about GBP 354 billion in 2018. We argue that the SWF would have provided a number of 
additional benefits. First, there would be much lower volatility of payouts from the fund 
compared with the volatility of resource revenues; this would have consequences for fiscal 
stability. Second, owing to the early 1980’s boom in oil prices, the fund would have fairly 
rapidly produced annual income greater than annual resource revenues.22 Finally, the UK 
government would today enjoy a rough doubling of the public sector balance sheet, and the 
balance sheet would be more diversified. This latter point is perhaps the most important, as 
IMF (2018) suggests: a stronger public sector balance sheet can yield important fiscal 
benefits. 
 
The analysis of resource asset accounts for the UK suggests that these accounts provide 
valuable information that, if included in the public sector balance sheet, could strengthen the 
published figures for net worth and send a signal to the markets for UK debt. We show that 
the sum of current resource wealth and the simulated SWF increases public sector net worth 
by 24% of GDP by 2006, compared to the figures published by ONS. As we have noted at 
several points, our simulation of a UK SWF does not include a counterfactual path for public 
spending in the presence of a SWF, largely because we feel such a counterfactual would be 
 
22 This boom, of course, could not have been foreseen by decision-makers in 1975. 
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arbitrary. But we have also noted that investing resource revenues in the fund from 1975 to 
1988 would have entailed a tightening of public finances, with consequences for GDP 
growth. After 1988 the constraints on public finance could have been looser because the fund 
simulation shows that payouts from the fund would have exceeded resource revenues in 1988 
and beyond. Because we assume that the fund would be invested in foreign assets, there also 
would have been counterfactual impacts on the Sterling exchange rate as well, potentially 
lowering Dutch Disease effects. 
 
Over the long period this analysis covers, a key decision not to establish a SWF was made in 
1979. Government considered the question of sustainability and rejected it. Hughes (2014) 
has questioned the value of a formal SWF in a large, diverse economy with relatively small 
petroleum resources. He suggests that the resource rents should indeed be reinvested in other 
forms of capital, but that it is sufficient to monitor indicators such as depletion-adjusted net 
saving to track the extent to which this is happening. Our analysis of asset accounts for the 
UK, however, suggests that depletion-adjusted net saving has been quite low since 1975 
(averaging just under 5% of GDP, with dips below 0 in the 2000s), which would be 
consistent with weak investment of resource revenues.  
 
Based on our analysis, it is at least arguable that the discipline imposed by establishing a 
SWF could have generated greater benefits from the North Sea petroleum windfall than were 
actually realised in the UK. Of course, this is now water under the bridge as far as practical 
policy is concerned. It is perhaps surprising though that only recently, in the context of the 
pros and cons of developing the UK’s shale oil and gas resources, has the issue has been 
raised again. However, our speculative assessment in this paper is that barring propitious 
assumptions about physical extent and the economic value of depletion, any fund – based on 
remaining conventional and unconventional resources – while not insubstantial is unlikely to 
approach the magnitude of the SWF that we simulate over the period 1975-2018.  
 
Our analysis has focused on the benefits to the UK that could have resulted from establishing 
a SWF for the exploitation of North Sea petroleum resources. But the context for future 
exploitation of petroleum has changed as the world takes stock of climate damages from 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The fact that the UK is a signatory to the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change is part of this changing context. If the UK were to develop shale 
resources and establish a SWF, the inclusion of global climate damages as part of the 
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economic analysis for such a project would provide valuable transparency. But it would not 
necessarily answer the overarching question of the future role that petroleum resources will 
play in a changing climate, as well as related decisions about investing the proceeds of 
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Annex 1: Data and assumptions  
 
Table A1.1:  Assumptions and Parameter Choices for Petroleum Asset Accounts 
 
Assumption or parameter Value 
Resource lifetime Proven plus probable reserves divided by current 
production rates 
Path of resource rents Fixed at the current year and held constant up to the 
point of exhaustion 
Co-production For accounting purposes gas is treated as a co-product 
of oil extraction 
Opportunity cost of fixed capital 
(assumed rate of return on assets) 
4.3% 





Table A1.2: Monetary Asset Account for UK Oil & Gas, 1975-2018 (2018, million GBP) 
Notes: “…” indicates negligible or negative values. 
 Asset value Production value Resource rent Depletion value (% of res. rent) 
1975 …     1,842  …    …    …    
1976 …     5,111  …    …    …    
1977  135,716   12,561  5,194 2,171 41.8% 
1978  129,673   15,028  5,663 2,996 52.9% 
1979  505,407   37,697  26,930 17,268 64.1% 
1980  423,335   35,011  23,370 15,359 65.7% 
1981  428,133   38,767  25,845 17,931 69.4% 
1982  452,898   45,179  31,041 22,912 73.8% 
1983  452,658   49,900  34,859 26,930 77.3% 
1984  483,223   57,698  41,765 33,491 80.2% 
1985  399,055   54,430  36,932 30,189 81.7% 
1986  97,015   26,689  9,500 7,878 82.9% 
1987  102,719   27,108  10,496 8,792 83.8% 
1988  37,615   19,725  3,886 3,263 84.0% 
1989  34,455   19,003  3,223 2,642 82.0% 
1990  40,728   20,213  3,822 3,136 82.0% 
1991  14,492   18,345  1,307 1,060 81.2% 
1992  3,384   17,766  291 233 80.1% 
1993  15,554   19,611  1,372 1,107 80.7% 
1994  32,066   21,675  3,256 2,724 83.7% 
1995  42,857   22,852  4,766 4,067 85.3% 
1996  79,933   26,800  8,971 7,669 85.5% 
1997  59,222   24,310  6,424 5,454 84.9% 
1998  13,607   19,422  1,654 1,436 86.8% 
1999  40,665   23,215  5,609 4,974 88.7% 
2000  122,367   34,182  17,170 15,266 88.9% 
2001  114,935   32,222  15,876 14,081 88.7% 
2002  105,497   31,140  14,940 13,302 89.0% 
2003  94,926   28,797  13,221 11,741 88.8% 
2004  104,686   29,119  13,838 12,188 88.1% 
2005  162,791   34,991  19,573 16,957 86.6% 
2006  198,726   38,789  22,937 19,719 86.0% 
2007  166,710   35,541  19,160 16,457 85.9% 
2008  249,747   44,977  27,437 23,353 85.1% 
2009  94,684   27,738  9,935 8,373 84.3% 
2010  168,121   34,881  16,900 14,103 83.5% 
2011  245,832   38,721  20,463 16,222 79.3% 
2012  206,676   35,143  15,126 11,468 75.8% 
2013  126,046   31,783  9,162 6,927 75.6% 
2014  9,242   26,119  680 516 76.0% 
2015 …     21,138  …    …    …    
2016 …     18,250  …    …    …    
2017 …     22,470  …    …    …    
2018  46,599   28,238  5,441 4,688 86.2% 
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Table A1.3: Estimates of Potential Shale Resources in the UK (mtoe)[a] 
 
Study Area of assessment Shale Gas Shale Oil Total 















58,140 (p10)  
 20,880 (p90) 
33,930 (p50) 
57,140 (p10) 
Andrews (2014) Weald Basin, 
Southern England 






Greenhalgh (2016) Wessex, Southern 
England 
 32 (p90) 
149 (p50) 
378  (p10) 
32 (p90) 
149 (p50) 
378  (p10) 







[a] Estimates refer to total resources-in-place unless otherwise indicated, where p(90) refers to 90% probability of these 
estimated resources being exceeded, p(50) refers to 50% probability of these estimated resources being exceeded and p(10) 
refers to a 10% probability of these estimated resources being exceeded. Taken as a whole, these data indicate resource 
extent is roughly 23,000 mtoe with a 90% probability, and at least 37,000 mtoe and 63,000 mtoe with 50% and 10% 
probabilities respectively. 




Table A1.4: Assumptions and Parameter Choices for Simulated Fund for Unconventional Gas 
and Oil 
 
Parameter Resource Assumed value Low Central High 
Resources-in-place Gas (therms) 8,856 14,323 24,551 
 Oil (million tonnes) 761 1,558 3,049 
     
Proportion of resources in place which are 
economically recoverable 
Gas 0.02 0.05 0.08 
 Oil 0.01 0.025 0.04 
Price Gas (p/therm) 30 50 70 
 Oil (GBP per tonne) 300 500 700 
Rent as a proportion of production value Gas/ oil 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Revenue capture as a proportion of total rent Gas/ oil 0.5 0.65 0.8 
 




Annex 2: Volatility and a simulated SWF 
 
In this annex we simulate a SWF for the UK that invests only in US financial assets, yielding 
results that are in some respects more realistic than those calculated in the main body of the 
paper. The analysis builds upon historical data on nominal returns on US financial assets 
going back to 1928 (reported in Damodaran 2014), as well as historical inflation data from 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.We simulate two funds that invest in a portfolio of 60% 
S&P 500 equities and 40% 10 year bonds. The first uses the historical annual returns for such 
a portfolio, based on data from Damadoran (2014). The second simulates smoothed returns 
using the methods applied to the SWF of the main text, with a long-run (1928-2013) real rate 
of return of 4.6% for the 60-40 portfolio, again based on the Damadoran (2014) data. 
 
Figure A2.1:  UK SWF Invested in US Financial Assets, Smoothed and Unsmoothed, 
$mn (nominal), 1975-2010 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
Figure A2.1 plots resource revenues and payouts from the unsmoothed and smoothed funds 
in nominal dollars from 1975 to 2010. As expected, the curves for resource revenues and the 
smoothed fund bear a family resemblance to the equivalent curves in Figure 3, with the key 
difference being nominal dollars vs. constant 2010 GBP. By 2010 the unsmoothed fund using 
historical nominal returns is nearly 50% larger than the smoothed fund (reflecting high 
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returns on financial assets in the US during the 1980s and 1990s), and its payouts are much 
more volatile. 
 
By measuring year-on-year changes in revenues and the two measures of fund returns, we 
calculate the volatility of these changes as seen in Table A2.1. The first column of the table 
shows that even unsmoothed payouts, based on historical nominal returns on financial assets, 
reduce the volatility of flows into the Treasury considerably compared to the alternative of 
simply paying the proceeds of resource taxation into general revenues.  
 
Table A2.1: Standard Deviation of Year on Year Changes in Revenues and Fund 
Payouts 
 
 US1 UK2 World3 
 1985-2010 1985-2010 1997-2010 
Resource revenues 35.2% 36.5% 35.8% 
Unsmoothed payouts 13.1% 17.3% 16.4% 
Smoothed payouts 5.8% 5.1% 10.3% 
Source: authors’ calculations 




By way of comparison, the second column looks at the volatility of a fund based on the return 
on UK equities over the same period. The final column measures the volatility of a global 
portfolio over 1997-2010 (based on data on global returns in Dimson et al. 2002). The 
rankings of the different measures of the volatility of revenues and fund payouts are the same 
across the three columns, while the UK and World portfolios exhibit higher levels of 
volatility compared to the US.  
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Annex 3: Applying the ‘permanent income hypothesis’ approach to UK petroleum data  
 
The policy goal under the permanent income approach is to convert a finite stream of 
resource revenues derived from rents into a constant and permanent flow of income. We 
assume that resources are extracted from some initial date 𝑡0 to the date of exhaustion 𝑇. The 
unit resource rent on extraction is denoted 𝑛, while the quantity extracted is 𝑅. Both 𝑛 and 𝑅 
are assumed to be constant. For fixed interest rate 𝑟 the value of the resource asset at time 𝑡 is 
therefore, 
 





The permanent income approach assumes that some share of resource rents is transferred to 
general revenues at the Treasury, while the balance is invested in a natural resource fund 
yielding 𝑟. The funds invested in the natural resource fund are assumed to be equal to the 
instantaneous change in the value of the resource asset associated with current extraction 
−?̇?(𝑡). 
 
The current transfer of resource revenues to the Treasury 𝑌𝑅(𝑡) is therefore 
 
𝑌𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑛𝑅 + ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑁(𝑡)  
 
The value of the natural resource fund 𝐴(𝑡) is the cumulative sum of investments in the fund 
since the initiation of resource extraction, 
 





The returns on the natural resource fund are paid to government general revenues, given by 
 
𝑌𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑟 ⋅ ((𝑁(𝑡0) − 𝑁(𝑡))  
 
Therefore the total funds paid to government general revenues at time 𝑡 equal 
 




The total payment to general revenues will therefore be constant over time. In practice the 








Similarly, resource tax revenues 𝑉(𝑡) will also vary over time and will generally be less than 
resource rent. We therefore adjust the values of 𝑌(𝑡), 𝑌𝑅(𝑡) and 𝑌𝐴(𝑡) by multiplying by the 







To compare the results between applying the bird in hand and permanent income approaches 
to managing petroleum revenues in the UK, Figure A3.1 plots the fund payments to general 
revenues under bird in hand (also presented in Figure 3 of the main text) and the separate 
payments from resource revenues 𝑌𝑅(𝑡) and the natural resource fund 𝑌𝐴(𝑡) as well as the 
total payments 𝑌(𝑡) under the permanent income approach.  
 
Common to both approaches, some portion of tax revenue is dedicated towards saving in a 
fund. In the case of the current figure this means not consuming much of the large revenues 
of the early to mid-1980s, in particular. However, the permanent income approach will direct 
a greater portion of tax revenues to government general receipts early in the depletion 
programme in contrast to the bird-in-hand approach. This has two (opposing) effects. It 
reduces the opportunity costs that Government would face in the 1980s under a bird-in-hand 
rule. But it also results in a smaller resource investment fund. 
 
This is illustrated in Figure A3.2 which plots the total value of the natural resource funds 
accumulated under the bird-in-hand and permanent income approaches. By 2018 the 
permanent income approach yields a fund which is roughly half the size of the bird-in-hand 
fund. The figure also makes clear that the latter is considerably larger than the former over 
most of the period (at least as assumed in this comparison). This has the obvious 
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consequences for the public sector balance sheet as discussed in Section 4.1 of the main text 
(Figure 5).  
Figure A3.1: Resource Revenues and Returns from (Simulated) Bird-in-hand and 
Permanent Income SWFs (GBP millions, 2018) 
 
Source: OBR (various) and authors estimates  
 
Figure A3.2: Total Value of (Simulated) Bird-in-hand and Permanent Income SWFs 
(GBP millions, 2018) 
 
Source: OBR (various) and authors estimates 
